C.S. Lewis on Divine Omnipotence
An exploration of the argument set forth in Ch. 2 of C.S. Lewis’ book "The Problem of Pain".
In The Problem of Pain, C.S. Lewis addresses the question of how an omnibenevolent and omnipotent God could create a world where suffering exists. He spends the first few chapters defining his terms so that a productive discussion may be held between himself and the reader. I found his progression of thought in chapter 2, on defining what divine omnipotence actually allows for, to be especially genius.
Lewis begins with the basic definition of omnipotence, ‘power to do all, or everything’. The general assumption based on this definition is that there is nothing that God cannot do. But this assumption leaves out the philosophical discussion of nonexistents. Nonexistents refer to those things which are self-contradictory, or intrinsic impossibilities. The common example given for this is to ask the student to imagine a round square. There is no way to do this without changing the nature of what is round or the nature of a square; and if their nature is changed then the object no longer is what it is, which makes it being a round square as it is an intrinsic impossibility. Lewis concludes this introduction to nonexistents with a disclaimer that we must take great caution in discussing what God cannot do as we are limited to human reason and understanding.
“You may attribute miracles to Him, but not nonsense. This is no limit to His power.”
My first time reading through this chapter, I was somewhat confused as to why he began with a discussion of nonexistents and then seemed to move on to other topics such as the laws of nature, the self and society. But Lewis, of course, has written his argument in a way that his conclusions are based on proofs he has already laid forth. Now that the reader has a basic understanding of the concept of nonexistents, Lewis lays forth several intrinsic impossibilities found in the world using the topics of nature, the self and society.
Nature must be relatively independent and ‘inexorable’ to allow a free-willed humanity to exist. The nonexistent: A free-willed humanity existing in a world where nature is controlled in order to protect humanity.
If matter is to serve as a neutral field it must have a fixed nature of its own. The nonexistent: Matter being a neutral field without having a nature of its own.
Free souls cannot be prevented from dealing in competition rather than courtesy. The nonexistent: Free souls being forced to deal in courtesy.
Exclude the possibility of suffering the order of nature and existence of free will involves and you exclude life itself. The nonexistent: Life without the possibility of suffering due to the order of nature and existence of free will.
His final conclusion, which he does lay forth as a suggestion rather than a fact, ties this discussion back to the problem at hand. He states, “Perhaps this is not the ‘best of all possible’ universes, but the only possible one.” He is suggesting that a world created without suffering is an intrinsic impossibility.
While this conclusion does not solve the problem of suffering or necessarily bring any comfort to an individual who is currently experiencing suffering, it is a good development in the argument for God being all powerful even with the existence of suffering.